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Abstract 
   The development of next generation protocols, such as UDT (UDP-based data transfer), 
promptly addresses various infrastructure requirements for transmitting data in high speed 
networks. However, this development creates new vulnerabilities when these protocols are 
designed to solely rely on existing security solutions of existing protocols such as TCP and 
UDP. It is clear that not all security protocols (such as TLS) can be used to protect UDT, just 
as security solutions devised for wired networks cannot be used to protect the unwired ones. 
The development of UDT, similarly in the development of TCP/UDP many years ago, lacked 
a well-thought security architecture to address the problems that networks are presently 
experiencing. This paper proposes and analyses practical security mechanisms for UDT.  
 





     The prevalent and significant development of advanced high speed networks has created 
opportunities for new technology to prosper.  
      Recent developments in network research introduced an enhanced version of UDT, 
considered to be one of the next generation of high performance data transfer protocols [10]. 
UDT introduces a new three-layer protocol architecture that is composed of a connection flow 
multiplexer, enhanced congestion control, and resource management. The new design allows 
protocol to be shared by parallel connections and to be used by future connections. It 
improves congestion control and reduces connection set-up time.  
      UDT provides better usability by supporting a variety of network environments and 
application scenarios [8,9,10,11]. It addresses TCP’s limitations by reducing the overhead 
required to send and receive streams of data. 
     One compelling example of the implementation of UDT is the Sloan Digital Sky Survey 
(SDSS) project [46,49], which is mapping in detail one quarter of the entire sky, determining 
the positions and brightness of more than 300 million celestial objects. It measures distances 
to more than a million galaxies and quasars. The data from the SDSS project so far has 
increased to 2 terabytes and continues to grow. Currently, this 2 terabytes of data is being 
delivered to the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, and China. 
Astronomers also want to execute online analysis on multiple datasets stored in 
geographically distributed locations [17]. This implementation offers a promising direction 
for future high speed data transfer in various industries.  
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     Securing data during its operations across network layers is therefore imperative in 
ensuring UDT itself is protected when implemented. The challenge to reduce the cost and 
complexity of running streaming applications over the Internet and through wireless and 
mobile devices, while maintaining security and privacy for their communication links, 
continues to mount.    
     The absence of a well-thought security mechanism for UDT in its development, however, 
drives this paper to introduce ways to secure UDT in a few implementation scenarios.  
      This paper presents application and IP-based mechanisms and a combination of existing 
security solutions of existing layers that may assist in further enhancing the work earlier 
presented by Bernardo [8,9,10,11] for UDT.   
       Bernardo [8] presented a framework which adequately addresses vulnerability issues by 
implementing security mechanisms in UDT while maintaining transparency in data delivery. 
The development of the framework was based on the analyses drawn from the source codes 
of UDT found at SourceForge.net. The source codes were analyzed and tested on Win32 and 
Linux environments to gain a better understanding on the functions and characteristics of this 
new protocol.       
       Network and security simulations using NS2 [37] and the Evaluation Methods for 
Internet Security Technology tool (EMIST) developed at the Pennsylvania State University 
with support from the US Department of Homeland Security and the National Science 
Foundation [38], were performed. Most of the security vulnerability testing, however, was 
conducted through simple penetration and traffic load tests. The results provided significant 
groundwork in the development of a proposal for a variety of mechanisms to secure UDT 
against various adversaries, such as Sybil, addresses, man-in-the-middle and the most 
common, DoS attacks.  
      This paper discusses these mechanisms, their simulation and implementation in a 
controlled environment. The discussion is categorized in the following format. In Section 2 of 
this paper, the authors present an overview of UDT [17]. More details on UDT and its 
architecture were discussed by Bernardo in his early works [8,9,10,11]. His works were 
drawn from and mainly influenced by the works of Gu [17], who developed UDT at the 
National Data Mining Centre in the US. Also in this section, the descriptions of the proposed 
security designs and implementation drawn from the initial work performed by Bernardo, and 
the motivation behind his work, are presented. In Sections 3, 4 and 5, new security 
approaches are presented. Section 6 discusses the conclusion of the paper and future work. 
 
2. Overview  
 
      UDT is a connection-oriented duplex protocol [17], which supports data streaming and 
partial reliable messaging. It also uses rate-based congestion control (rate control) and 
window-based flow control to regulate outgoing traffic. This was designed such that rate 
control updates the packet sending period every constant interval, whereas flow control 
updates the flow window size each time an acknowledgment packet is received. It was 
expanded to satisfy more requirements for both network research and applications 
development [8-11,17]. This expansion is called Composable UDT and is designed to 
complement the kernel space network stacks. However, this feature is intended for: 
 
• Implementation and deployment of new control algorithms. Data transfer 
through private links can be implemented using Composable UDT. 
• Composable UDT supports application-aware algorithms. 
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• Ease of testing new algorithms for kernel space when using Composable UDT 
compared to modifying an OS kernel. 
 
     The Composable UDT library implements a standard TCP Congestion Control Algorithm 
(CTCP). CTCP can be redefined to implement more TCP variants, such as TCP (low-based) 
and TCP (delay-based). The designers [10] emphasized that the Composable UDT library 
does not implement the same mechanisms as those in the TCP specification. TCP uses byte-
based sequencing, whereas UDT uses packet-based sequencing. This does not prevent CTCP 
from simulating TCP’s congestion avoidance behavior [8-11,17]. 
      UDT was designed with the Configurable Congestion Control (CCC) interface which is 
composed of four categories: 1) control event handler call backs, 2) protocol behavior 
configuration, 3) packet extension, and 4) performance monitoring. Its services/features can 
be used for bulk data transfer and streaming data processing, unlike TCP which cannot be 
used for this type of processing because it has two problems. Firstly, in TCP, the link must be 
clean (little packet loss) for it to fully utilize the bandwidth. Secondly, when two TCP streams 
start at the same time, the stream with longer RTT will be starved due to the RTT bias 
problem; thus, the data analysis process will have to wait for the slower data stream [8-11].  
     UDT, moreover, can cater for streaming video to many clients. It can also provide 
selective streaming for each client when required, whereas TCP cannot send data at a fixed 
rate. Additionally, in UDP most of the data reliability control work has to be handled by the 
application. 
      
3. Related Works 
 
     Bernardo and Hoang [8-11] present a security framework highlighting the need to secure 
UDT. The work focuses on UDT’s position in the layer architecture which provides a layer-
to-layer approach to addressing security. Its implementation relies on proven security 
mechanisms developed and implemented on existing mature protocols. A summary of 
security mechanisms and their implementations are presented in fig. 1. 
 
4. Motivations 
     
    As UDT is at the application layer or on top of UDP, data are required to be transmitted 
securely and correctly. This is implemented by each application and not by an operating 
system or by a separate stack [8]. These implementations may be, and often are, based on 
generic libraries [17]. The existence of five application-dependent components, such as the 
API module, the sender, receiver, and UDP channel, as well as four data components: 
sender’s protocol buffer, receiver’s protocol buffer, sender’s loss list and receiver’s loss list 
[8], require that UDT security features must be implemented on an application basis.       
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Figure 1: UDT in Layer Architecture.  UDT is in the application layer above UDP. 
The application exchanges its data through UDT socket, which then uses UDP 
socket to send or receive data [8-11] 
4.1   UDT Security Limitations  
      The contention for the need of security mechanisms of the new UDT is derived from four 
important observations [2,5].  
 
• Absence of an inherent security mechanism, such as checksum for UDT 
• Dependencies on user preferences and implementation on the layer on which it 
is implemented 
• Dependencies on existing security mechanisms of other layers on the stack 
• Dependencies on TCP/UDP which are dependent on nodes and their addresses 
for high speed data transfer protocol leading to a number of attacks such as 
neighborhood, Sybil and DoS (Denial of Service) attacks.  
     The presentation of a security framework for UDT supports the need to minimize its 
sending rates [8-11] in retransmissions and to introduce its own checksum in its design. It 
also supports the importance of implementing security in UDT. However, the introduction of 
other security mechanisms to secure UDT is presented to address its vulnerabilities to 
adversaries exploiting the application, transport, and IP layers.  
          4.1.1   Possible Security Mechanisms   
       Previous literature [8-11] presented an overview of the basic security mechanisms for 
UDT. As the research progresses, the following approaches are further developed. 
        UDT is designed to run on UDP and is thus dependent on its existing security 
mechanisms. Consequently, the designers of the applications that use UDT are faced with 
limited choices to protect the transmission. This paper proposes the following. Firstly, 
utilising IPsec RFC 2401; however, for a number of reasons, this is only suitable for some 
applications [7]. Secondly, designing a custom security mechanism on the application layer 
using API, such as GSS-API [23,29,47], or a custom security mechanism on IP layer, such as 
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HIP-CGA [1,3,4,5,19,21,25,26,33,43] Thirdly, integrating SASL [31] or DTLS [39] on the 
transport layer. 
        These approaches can be significant for application and transport layer- based 
authentication and end-to-end security for UDT. 
 
• GSS-API - Generic Security Service Application  Program Interface 
[23,29,47]   
• Self-certifying addresses using HIP-CGA  
• SASL - Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [31] 
• DTLS – Data Transport Layer Security [39] 
• IPsec – IP security [7] 
• UDT-AO – Authentication Option 
 
They are also applicable  to a combination of  the following: 
 
* SASL/GSS-API for authentication + channel binding to DTLS, DTLS for data 
integrity/confidentiality protection 
 
* SASL/GSS-API for authentication + channel binding to IPsec, IPsec for data 
integrity/confidentiality protection 
 
In this paper, only a brief description of each approach is presented due to space limitations. 
 
5. Securing UDT  
      
    Bernardo [8-11] presented an overview on securing UDT implementations in various 
layers. However securing UDT in application and other layers needs to be explored in future 
UDT deployments in various applications.  
       There are application and transport layer-based authentication and end-to-end [12] 
security options for UDT. This paper also advocates the use of GSS-API in UDT in the 
development of an application using TCP/UDP. The use of Host Identity Protocol (HIP), a 
state of the art protocol, combined with Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) is 
explored to solve the problems of address-related attacks.  
5.1 Host Identity Protocol (HIP)  
      Implementing Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [1,19] is one possible way to secure UDT on 
top of UDP and IP. This protocol solves the problem of address generation in a different way 
by removing the dual functionality of IP addresses as both host identifiers and topological 
locations. In order to do this, a new network layer called the Host Identity is required. 
       Securing IP addresses plays an important role in networking, especially in the transport 
layer. Generating a secure IP address can be achieved through HIP. It is considered the 
building block which is used in other protocols, as well as being a way to secure the address 
generation in practice [19].  
       Much literature has been published on the various research on HIP since it was first 
introduced in RFC 4423. This resulted in a number of new experimental RFCs in April of 
2008. 
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       Host identification is attained by using IP addresses that depend on the topological 
location of the hosts, consequently overloading them. The main motivation behind HIP is to 
separate the location and host identification information to minimize stressing IP addresses, 
since they are identifying both hosts and topological locations. HIP introduces a new 
namespace, cryptographic in nature, for host identities [19]. The IP addresses continue to be 
used for packet routing. 
        Using HIP for UDP/TCP in the transport layer of the new network layer, called Host 
Identity (HI),  protects not only the underlying protocol, but UDT as well, since it is running 
on top of UDP. HI is placed between the IP and transport layer; see fig. 2. 
        In HIP, the public-key [32,39] of an asymmetric key pair is used as the HI and the host 
itself is defined as the entity that holds the private-key from the key pair. Application and 
other higher layer protocols are bound to HI instead of an IP address. The prerequisite for HIP 








5.2 Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) 
 
      Solving the problems of address-related attacks can be also be achieved by using CGA for 
address and verification. Self-certifying is widely used and standardized, such as by Host 
Identity Protocol (HIP) [1,19] and Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP) [2]. 
  CGA [3,4] uses the cryptographic hash of the public key. It is a generic method for self-
certifying address generation and verification that can be used for specific purposes. In this 
paper, the conventions are used to either  IPv4 or IPv6. 
     The simplified setting for CGA is presented in fig. 3. The interface identifier is generated 
by taking the cryptographic hash [39] of the encoded public-key of the user. Modern 
cryptography has functions that produce a message digest with more than the required 
number of bits in CGA. The interface identifier is formed by truncation of the output of the 
cryptographic hash function to a specific number of bits depending on the leftmost number of 
bits that form the subnet prefix, i.e., IPv6 addresses are 128-bit data blocks, therefore the 
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leftmost bits are 64 and the rightmost bits are 64. The prefix is used to determine the location 
of each node in Internet topology and the interface identifier is used as an identity of the 
node. Using a cryptographic hash of the public-key is the most effective method to generate 
self-certifying addresses. 
     In CGA, the assumption is that each node in the network is equipped with a public-key 
before generating its address and the underlying public-key cryptosystems have no known 
weaknesses. Similarly, in UDT, the assumption is that its protection is derived from the 
security controls implemented on existing transport layers. In this paper, the authors focus on 




Figure 3: Simplified and modified principle of Cryptographically 
Generated Addresses [3].  
 
        5.2.1  HIP-CGA and UDT         
 
        HIP introduces a new namespace, which is cryptographic in nature, for host identifiers. 
It introduces a way of separating the location and host identity information.  





The HIT is 128 bits long and has the following three properties [1,19]: 
 
- It can be used in address-sized fields in APIs and protocols  
- It is self-certifying (i.e., given a HIT, it is computationally hard to find a Host Identity 
key that matches this HIT) 
- The probability of HIT collision between two hosts is very low. 
 
       The HITs are self-certifying. This means that no certificates are needed in practice. 
 
       The protocol used in HIP to establish an IP-layer communications context, called HIP 
association, prior to communications is called base exchange [5]. The details are briefly 
summarized below [33] 
 
- Initiator sends a trigger packet (I1) to responder containing the HIT of the initiator and 
possibly the HIT of the responder if it is known. 
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- Next, the responder sends the (R1) packet which contains a puzzle, a cryptographic 
challenge that the initiator must solve before continuing the exchange. The puzzle 
mechanism is to protect the responder from a number of DoS threat, see  RFC 5201 
[33,34]. R1 contains the initial Diffie-Hellman parameters and a signature, covering a 
part of the message. 
- In the I2 packet, the initiator must display the solution to the received puzzle. If an 
incorrect solution is given, the I2 message is discarded. I2 also contains a Diffie-
Hellman parameter that carries needed information for the responder. The packet is 
signed by the sender. 
- The R2 packet finalizes the base exchange and the packet is then signed. 
 
      The base exchange protocol is used to establish a pair of IPsec security associations 
between two hosts for further communication.  
       HIP introduces a cryptographic namespace for host identifiers to remove the dual 
functionality of IP addresses as both identifiers and topological locations.   
       When UDT is implemented on top of UDP, its packets are delivered through HIP. With 
HIP, the transport layer operates on Host identities instead of using IP addresses as end 
points. At the same time, the network layer uses IP addresses as pure locators. This provides 
added protection to the transport layer with applications using UDT’s high speed data 
transmission. With the development of hashed encoding of Host Identifier, a Host Identity 
Tag can be used in address-sized fields in API’s and protocols, including UDT. The hash is 
truncated to values which are larger in the case of IPv6 implementation, and hence more 
secure compared with all security levels of CGA [3,4].  
        HIP uses base exchange protocol [5] to establish a pair of IPsec security associations 
between two hosts for further communication.  The main challenge of implementing HIP is 
the requirement of a new network layer, called the Host Identity [1], which is difficult to run 
with existing networking protocols in use. 
5.3 Generic Security Service- Application Program Interface (GSS-API)  
       There are significant application and transport layer based authentication and end-to-end 
security options for UDT. In this paper, the authors also propose - Generic Security Service 
Application  Program Interface (GSS-API).   
       The GSS-API is a generic API for carrying out DT client-server authentication. The 
motivation behind it is that every security system has its own API [26], and the effort in 
adding different security systems to applications is made extremely difficult by the variance 
between security APIs. However, with a common API, application vendors could write to the 
generic API and it could work with any number of security systems, according to [17,29,48]. 
Vendors can use GSS-API during the UDT implementation. It is considered the easiest to use 
and implement and implementations exist, such as Kerberos [35]. 
        The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface provides security 
services to calling applications. It allows a communicating application to authenticate the user 
associated with another application, to delegate rights to another application, and to apply 
security services such as confidentiality and integrity on a per-message basis. Details of GSS-
API are discussed in RFC 1964 [29,48].   
 
      In summary, the protocol when used in UDT application can be viewed as: 
• Authenticate (exchange opaque GSS context) through the user interface and 
CCC option of UDT.  
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• The utilize per-message token functions (GSS-API) to protect UDT messages 
during transmissions. 
     The GSS-API is a rather large API for some implementations, but for applications using 
UDT, one need only use a small subset of that API [48].  
 
5.4 Data Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 
 
      Another possible mechanism is DTLS. DTLS [40] provides communications privacy for 
datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way 
that is designed to prevent  eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.  The DTLS 
protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [14] protocol and provides 
equivalent security guarantees.  Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved 
by the DTLS protocol. DTLS is similar to TLS, but DTLS is designed for datagram transport.  
     High speed data transmission uses datagram transport such as UDP for communication 
due to the delay-sensitive nature of transported data. The speed of delivery and behavior of 
applications running UDT are unchanged when DTLS is used to secure communication, since 
it does not compensate for lost or re-ordered data traffic when applications using UDT 
running on top of UDP are employed. 
      DTLS, however, is susceptible to DoS attacks. Such attacks are launched by consuming 
excessive resources on the server by transmitting a series of handshake initiation requests, 
and by sending connection initiation messages with a forged source of the victim. The server 
sends its next message to the victim machine, thus flooding it. In implementing DTLS, 
designers need to include cookie exchange with every handshake  during the implementation 
of applications using UDT and UDP. 
 
5.5. Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)   
 
     Most protocols for application security, such as DTLS, operate at or above the transport 
layer. This renders the underlying transport connections vulnerable to denial of service 
attacks, including connection assassination (RFC 3552).  IPsec offers the promise of 
protecting against many denial of service attacks. It also offers other potential benefits. 
Conventional software-based IPsec implementations isolate applications from the 
cryptographic keys, improving security by making inadvertent or malicious key exposure 
more difficult.  In addition, specialized hardware may allow encryption keys protected from 
disclosure within trusted cryptographic units.  Also, custom hardware units may well allow 
for higher performance.  
 
 
Figure 4: UDT flow using end-to-end security [8-11]. IPsec can be used 
without modifying UDT and the applications running it.  
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     Implementing UDT running at or above the application layers with IPsec provides 
adequate protection for data transmission (fig. 4). A datagram-oriented client application 
using UDT will use the connection-oriented part of its API (because it is using a given 
datagram socket to talk to a specific server), while the server it is talking to can use the 
connection-oriented API because it is using a single socket to receive requests from and send 
replies to a large number of clients.  
     If nothing else works or is possible in the development of APIs, and in introducing other 
protocols to protect UDT, IPsec may be a last possible option which provides less overhead in 
the implementation of applications running UDT. 
         IPsec can be administered separately and its management can be left to administrators to 
maintain. It is possible to create a security arrangement to secure UDT connections, such as 
authentication handled by IPsec. Since it relies on UDP, developers can use UDP 
encapsulation (see fig. 5) to ensure the connection from UDP is secure. IPsec provides 
encryption and keying services and offers authentication services; adding ESP extends 
services to encryption. Specifications on protecting UDP packets can be found on RFC3948. 
 
 
    UDP encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets 
Source Port  Destination Port   
Length Checksum   
  ESP Header (RFC2406)    






5.6. UDT-Authentication Option 
 
       UDT-Authentication Option (AO) is introduced to secure UDT -a new UDP-based data 
transport protocol. UDT is a connection oriented protocol. As such, it needs to include an 
OPTION for authentication when it is used in data transmission. This is because its 
connections like TCP, are likely to be spoofed [33].   
       In TCP, this option is part of the options (0-44 bytes) that occupy space at the end of the 
TCP header.  In utilising the option in TCP [17], this needs to be enabled in the socket. A few 
systems support this option, which is identified as TCP_MD5SIG option. Note: for the 
purpose of conceptual analysis, we use MD5 in this paper. 
 
int opt = 1;  Enabling this option  
setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG, &opt,    
sizeof(opt)); 
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  Additionally, the option is included in the checksum. The option may begin on any byte 
boundary, and the header must be padded with zeros to make the header length a multiple of 
32 bits.    
      Better authentication options in TCP are in progress to address the collision issue in MD5 
[34].  However in this paper, the primary motivation is to initially introduce an option to 
allow UDT to protect itself against the introduction of spoofed segments into the connection 
stream, regardless what authentication schemes required in a given number of bytes. This 
option, like in TCP, will be included in the UDP header. 
    UDT is in user space above the network transport layer of UDP, it is dependent on UDP 
where this option is not available, thus becomes a challenge in its implementation. UDT, 
however, provides transport functionalities to applications.  
    To spoof a connection of UDT, an attacker would not only have to guess UDT’s sequence 
numbers, but would also have had to obtain the password included in the MD5 digest. This 
password never appears in the connection stream, and the actual form of the password is up to 
the application, according to RFC 2385. It could during the lifetime of a particular connection 
so long as this change was synchronised on both ends (although retransmission can become 
problematical in some implementations with changing passwords) . 
     To utilise this option in UDT, similar to TCP this needs to be enabled in the socket. A few 
systems support this option, which can be identified as UDT_MD5SIG  or in the case of using 
SHA, UDT_SHASIG option.  
 
int opt = 1;  Enabling this option  
setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_UDT, UDT_MD5SIG, &opt,     
sizeof(opt)); 
 
     Likewise, the option is included in the UDP checksum. However, there is no negotiation 
for the use of this option in a connection (also in TCP) rather it is purely a matter of site 
policy whether or not its connections use the option. 
    The proposed option can be applied on type 2 of the UDT header. This field is reserved to 
define specific control packets in the Composable UDT framework.     
   Every segment sent on a UDT connection to be protected against spoofing will similarly 
contain the 16-byte MD5 digest produced by applying the MD5 algorithm to these items in 
the following similar order required for TCP : 
 
1.   UDP pseudo header  (Source and Destination IP addresses, port number, and  segment 
length) 
2.  UDT header + UDP (Sequence number and timestamp), and assuming a UDP  checksum 
zero 
3.   UDT control packet or segment data (if any) 
4.  Independently-specified key or password, known to both UDTs and presumably 
connection specific and 
5.    Connection key 
 
     The UDT packet header and UDP pseudo-header are in network byte order. The nature of 
the key is deliberately left unspecified, but it must be known by both ends of the connection, 
similar with TCP [19]. A particular UDT implementation will determine what the application 
may specify as the key. 
      MD5 algorithm, however, was found to be vulnerable to collision search attacks, and is 
considered by some to be insufficiently strong for this type of application [22],[28],[34]. 
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    However, we specify the MD5 algorithm for this option as basis of our argument to include 
AO to UDT. Systems that use UDT have been deployed operationally, and there was no 
"algorithm type" field defined to allow an upgrade using the same option number.  
    This does not, therefore, prevent the deployment of another similar option which uses 
another hashing algorithm (like SHA-1, SHA-256). Moreover, should most implementations 
pad the 18 byte option as defined to 20 bytes anyway, it would be just as well to define a new 
option which contains an algorithm type field.   
    In addressing the implication of MD5 collision issue, we recommend using a more secure 
message algorithm such as SHA-1 or SHA-256.   
 
6. Simulation and Implementation Schemes  
 
     In observing the behaviors of UDT in both protected and unprotected settings, (1) the 
Simulated and, (2) the Implementation schemes are constructed.  
      The simulated environment operates separately on ns2 [37] and EMIST [38] to provide 
internal validation. This environment is used to simulate the behavior of data transmission 
when UDT is used on top of UDP. A test is performed using a new probabilistic packet 
marking scheme constituted by 3000 nodes. 1000 attackers are selected randomly. To test and 
determine the number of packets required to reconstruct the attacking path, the selection of 
one path from all of the attacking paths and its length is w, w=1,2…30. For each value of w, a 
simultaneous change of values of w is repeatedly changed until the protocol shows a clear 
attacking path. This allows the simulation to produce a pattern of the behaviors of UDT 
without any means of protection.  
      The implementation environment comprises a simple topology. Two honey pot servers 
(HP1 and HP2) with UDT for windows are installed at two separate locations. They are in a 
network operating environment running on a 10G pipe trunk 802.1q for tunneling behind 
firewalls. The attackers are sourced from the Internet. In the first implementation, all traffic is 
allowed to traverse through any source, destined through any ports on UDP and TCP, and 
locked to the destination honey pot, where UDT is running on top of UDP. A simple data 
transfer of 600MB -200GB to another server is then performed. The test is initially performed 
without any protection. Subsequent tests are performed with the proposed security 
mechanisms and results are compared. 
 
The following protection schemes are attempted: 
(1) A simple authentication scheme using Kerberos [29,35] for GSS-API on an 
application running UDT and UDP 
(2) IPsec between H1 and H2, running the application within the encrypted tunnel 
(3) Using VPN SSL connections and running the applications in H1 and H2  
 
7.  Results  
 
The number of attacks in figures 6 and 7 is constant in the implementation scheme. The 
dropped packets were detected when the IDS/IPS was activated on the firewalls. The simple 
authentication scheme developed to transfer a file via UDT provided by Kerberos using GSS-
API on the UDP socket where UDT was operating provided an added protection that sources 
where the location of the  authenticating party  was located were assumed to be in the 
protected environment.   
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Figure 7: Protected environment 
 
    The trend presented in fig. 7  yields significant improvement. End-to-end transfer of data is 
transparent to the UDT application. The available security mechanisms for UDT that require 
minimal application and program development are feasible and predominantly applicable to 
UDT implementation.  
       In simple file transfer, many available mechanisms for UDP and TCP, and existing 
security protections for applications are acceptable, i.e., simple authentication. However, for 
extensive use of UDT, such as SDSS and other large project implementations that require 
security, UDT requires a security mechanism that is developed and tailored for its behaviors 
and characteristics based on its design.  This paper emphasizes the need, just like the existing 
mature protocols, for a continuing security evaluation to develop and provide adequate 
protection, and to maintain integrity and confidentiality against various adversaries and 
unknown attacks, as well as minimizing dependencies on other security solutions applied on 
other protocols to ensure minimal overhead in data and message transmission streams.  
     The limitations of the simulation and implementation schemes constructed may be the 
simplicity of the applications developed for the tests. Experiments are difficult to perform on 
the following mechanisms: HIP because of the required additional layer HIT, and DTLS + 
CGA because of lack of resources. These experiments will be performed in future work. 
        More extensive development of an application that uses UDT might have yielded more 
detailed and comprehensive results. Furthermore, the number of false positives and collisions 
are not considered in the tests. However, the results provide an important indication of how 
the application which utilizes UDT behaves in such environments. 
 
8.  Conclusion and Future Work  
 
     Protecting UDT can be achieved by introducing approaches related to self-certifying 
address generation and verification. A technique which can be applied without major 
modifications in practice is Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA). This technique is 
standardised in a protocol for IPv6. Similarly, HIP solves the problem of address generation 
in a different way by removing the functionality of IP addresses as both host identifiers and 
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topological locations. However in order to achieve this, a new network layer, called Host 
Identity (HI), is introduced, which makes HIP incompatible with current network protocols.  
        Protecting UDT by using GSS-API in UDT is another approach; however, this needs to 
be thoroughly evaluated by application vendors. The use of the GSS-API interface does not in 
itself provide an absolute security service or assurance; instead, these attributes are dependent 
on the underlying mechanism(s) of UDT which support   a GSS-API implementation to 
achieve adequate security mechanism. 
        Another way of protecting UDT is by introducing Authentication-Option (AO), 
however, this requires changes on the design of UDT to accommodate an AO field. There is 
also a requirement to use better hashing algorithms to ensure that messages transmitted are 
duly protected. 
         In the simulation and implementation schemes, IPsec provides adequate protection on 
data transfer, and also provides end to end protection on source and destination nodes. In this 
scheme, the performance of UDT remains the same. 
       More options remain to be explored such as DTLS – Data Transport Layer Security, 
SASL - Simple Authentication and Security Layer, and their combinations such as 
SASL/GSS-API for authentication + channel binding to DTLS; DTLS for data 
integrity/confidentiality protection; SASL/GSS-API for authentication + channel binding to 
IPsec; IPsec for data integrity/confidentiality protection. 
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